Daily Papers

ChatGPT has garnered significant interest due to its impressive performance; however, there is growing concern about its potential risks, particularly in the detection of AI-generated content (AIGC), which is often challenging for untrained individuals to identify. Current datasets used for detecting ChatGPT-generated text primarily focus on question-answering tasks, often overlooking tasks with semantic-invariant properties, such as summarization, translation, and paraphrasing. In this paper, we demonstrate that detecting model-generated text in semantic-invariant tasks is more challenging. To address this gap, we introduce a more extensive and comprehensive dataset that incorporates a wider range of tasks than previous work, including those with semantic-invariant properties. In addition, instruction fine-tuning has demonstrated superior performance across various tasks. In this paper, we explore the use of instruction fine-tuning models for detecting text generated by ChatGPT.

AI-generated text is nowadays produced at scale across domains and heterogeneous generation pipelines, making robustness to distribution shift a central requirement for supervised binary detectors. We train transformer-based detectors on HC3 PLUS and calibrate a single decision threshold by maximising balanced accuracy on held-out validation; this threshold is then kept fixed for all downstream test distributions, revealing domain- and generator-dependent error asymmetries under shift. We evaluate in-domain on HC3 PLUS, under cross-dataset transfer to the multi-domain, multi-generator M4 benchmark, and on the external AI-Text-Detection-Pile. Although base models achieve near-ceiling in-domain performance (up to 99.5% balanced accuracy), performance under shift is brittle and strongly model-dependent. Feature augmentation via attention-based linguistic feature fusion improves transfer, with our best model (DeBERTa-v3-base+FeatAttn) achieving 85.9% balanced accuracy on M4. Multi-seed experiments confirm high stability. Under the same fixed-threshold protocol, our model outperforms strong zero-shot baselines by up to +7.22 points. Category-level ablations further show that readability and vocabulary features contribute most to robustness under shift. Overall, these results demonstrate that feature augmentation and a modern DeBERTa backbone significantly outperform earlier BERT/RoBERTa models, while the fixed-threshold protocol provides a more realistic and informative assessment of practical detector robustness.

Robust detection of AI-generated text under deployment conditions is challenging: distribution shifts across domains and generators, adversarial perturbations of the input surface, and the absence of target-domain labels for threshold calibration all degrade detectors that perform well in-domain. We present DeBERTa-ConPara, a deployment-oriented detector combining attack-aware Unicode preprocessing with a contextual transformer encoder trained over HC3 Plus, M4, MAGE and RAID. Our central finding is that preprocessing acts in opposite directions depending on where it is applied: normalising the training corpus deduplicates it, collapsing 35.4% of RAID rows into copies of their clean siblings and deleting the adversarial supervision, whereas normalising at inference is an effective defence. A factorial varying the two placements independently identifies raw training with normalised inference as the best configuration, reaching 99.61% AUROC, 99.01% TPR@5% FPR and 96.57% TPR@1% FPR on the official RAID hidden test, alongside 93.14% average balanced accuracy across HC3 Plus and MAGE under a fixed threshold. The gain is confined to two of twelve attack classes: homoglyph and zero-width-space insertion rise from 11.05% and 1.12% to 96.98%. The same signature reproduces in a zero-shot detector of different architecture, showing the effect belongs to the attacks rather than to our model. We additionally report two negative results: semantic-invariance augmentation through paraphrasing and supervised contrastive learning (ConPara) does not improve the best configuration, and the handcrafted feature-fusion branch is inert in distribution and harmful outside it.